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Do achievers tend to share goodness with the world? The effect of subjective social status on prosocial risky behavior

BMC Psychology volume 13, Article number: 164 (2025) Cite this article

Abstract

The crisis of inequality in human society has profound implications, particularly in the context of risky helping dilemmas. This study examined the relationship between subjective social status and prosocial risky behavior (PRB) and its mediating mechanisms at both the trait and situational levels. Study 1 examined the relationship between trait subjective social status, holistic thinking, and PRB intention using a questionnaire. Study 2 further examined the causal relationships between situational subjective social status and PRB, their boundary conditions, and mediating mechanisms using experimental methods. The results showed that low-status individuals (vs. high-status individuals) tended to engage in more PRB for both trait and situational subjective social status. This difference existed only in the high-risk level condition. Furthermore, holistic thinking mediated the relationship between subjective social status and PRB. This has important implications for mitigating the negative impacts of social status disparities on individual psychology and behavior, promoting the enhancement of prosocial levels among individuals of different social statuses in risky situations.

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Introduction

Inequality in social status is a pervasive human social crisis across the globe, with the richest 1% of the world’s population holding 45% of the world’s wealth [1]. Scholars have been actively engaged in addressing the challenge of mitigating the negative impact of social status differences on individual psychology and behavior, particularly in the context of public crises [2]. For example, during the 2008 financial crisis, high-net-worth investors on Wall Street, who were of higher social status, exhibited overconfidence in their engagement with high-leverage financial derivative transactions. This overconfidence stemmed from their reliance on past successful experiences, leading them to overlook market volatility and risks. Consequently, they suffered significant financial losses. This example highlights the broader issue of how social status can influence decision-making.

Social status refers to the relative prestige and honor of an individual or group within society. It is typically associated with factors such as an individual occupation, level of education, income, wealth, and social contributions [3]. This distinguishes it from social class and socioeconomic status. In terms of scope, social status is a broader concept that encompasses certain aspects of socioeconomic status and social class, while socioeconomic status and social class are more specific, focusing respectively on economic resources, as well as stratification based on social, and cultural criteria. Regarding dimensions, social status is a multidimensional concept that includes not only economic factors but also cultural and prestige factors, whereas socioeconomic status primarily concerns economic resources. In terms of structural aspects, the concept of social class emphasizes stratification and inequality within the social structure, involving the distribution of power and resources among social members, whereas social status and socioeconomic status focus more on the position of individuals within society.

There are both subjective and objective aspects to social status, with objective social status often measured in terms of individual occupation, level of education, income, wealth, and social contributions, reflecting the material resources and social capital that an individual possesses in their social life [4]. Subjective social status is based on an individual subjective perception of the social hierarchy, reflecting the individual understanding and feeling of their relative position in the social hierarchy after social comparison [5]. Previous studies have shown that subjective social status has better predictive validity than objective social status for individual social cognitive and behavioral responses [3, 6], and that the two are only moderately correlated [7]. Compared to objective indicators, studies focusing on subjective social status are more credible and practical. Thus, this study will examine subjective social status to explore its social functions.

In real life, prosocial behaviors involve risks; when personal interests are threatened, individuals face an internal conflict between self-preservation and helping others [8]. During the “12·18” earthquake in Gansu, China, the People’s Liberation Army soldiers exemplified “in-danger assistance” by risking their lives to conduct rescue operations on the frontlines. Prosocial risky behavior is defined as actions undertaken at personal risk (such as physical, psychological, social status, reputational, etc.) to benefit others or promote societal welfare [8, 9]. This type of behavior is distinguished by two essential elements: firstly, the primary motivation is to confer benefits on others or society rather than oneself; secondly, the individual must bear certain unknown costs, as a consequence of their actions. Thus, prosocial risky behavior is considered a unique subset of prosocial behavior that inherently involves risk. Participants in these actions often face potentially unknown costs, underscoring the altruistic intent that prioritizes the welfare of others or the collective over personal gain [8, 9].

Prosocial risky behavior is distinct from both simple prosocial and simple risky behaviors due to its unique characteristics. Simple prosocial behaviors are actions that directly benefit others or society without imposing unknown or uncertain risks on the individual performing the act. Although these behaviors may involve personal costs or losses, such as donating time or money to charity, these costs are typically known and predictable. Moreover, simple risky behaviors involve actions that pose risks primarily to oneself or potentially to other related individuals, without necessarily providing benefits to others or society. The defining feature of prosocial risky behavior is the unpredictability of the costs associated with the risks undertaken, which sets it apart from simple prosocial behaviors. In prosocial risky behavior, the individual engages in actions that may benefit others or society, but the potential costs or losses to the individual are uncertain or unknown.

The theoretical model of prosocial risky behavior posits that it involves the integrated processing of individual risk preferences and social preferences [8, 9]. Risk preferences refer to the degree to which individuals seek risk in the face of risky situations, while social preferences reflect the tendency of individuals to consider the interests of others or society [9]. Previous studies have seldom directly explored how subjective social status influences prosocial risky behavior. Instead, they have primarily focused on its effects on individual risk or social preferences, with controversial findings [10, 11, 12, 13]. For example, some scholars have explored the differences in cognitive functioning among people with different subjective social status and hypothesized that people with low subjective social status are more risk-averse than those with high subjective social status from the perspective of resource scarcity [10]. However, Mishra et al. [11] found that those with lower social status are at a disadvantage in social competition and are more likely to take risks. In addition, some studies have found that people with lower subjective social status have higher levels of empathy and are more willing to offer help to others [6]. However, it has also been found that those with higher subjective social status are generally respected, experience more positive emotions such as pride and achievement, and have higher levels of prosociality [12, 13].

Differences in the manipulations of subjective social status may explain the inconsistent results of these studies. On the one hand, research identifying low subjective social status as a trigger for risk-seeking and altruistic tendencies often measures subjective social status through self-report, treating it as a relatively stable self-assessment. This approach neglects the fluidity of social status and the individual own subjective initiative. Individuals are actively working to improve their comprehensive qualities to achieve upward social mobility [14]. Individuals with low subjective social status maybe less fearful of loss due to resource scarcity, may be less threat-sensitive and have higher levels of cooperation-seeking interdependence preferences to better adapt to their environment and improve their social status, be more risk-seeking, and exhibit higher levels of prosociality [15, 16]. Evolutionary theory suggests that individual subjective social status is dynamic and that viewing it as a static self-perception is controversial [3, 15]. On the other hand, measures and manipulations of subjective social status are more comprehensive and ecologically valid in studies that have found that subjective social status positively predicts single prosocial or risk preferences. For example, some studies have used contextual elicitation to initiate different levels of subjective social status and to measure individual current experiences of their social status [17]. Therefore, this study uses a combination of trait perception and situational experience to comprehensively examine the effect of subjective social status on prosocial risky behavior.

The compensatory sense of control model suggests that those with low subjective social status have higher altruistic values and risk-taking tendencies [11, 18, 19]. Being more sensitive to external threats, people with low subjective social status may be more attentive to interpersonal relationships and tend to develop stronger bonds with unfamiliar others while also making them more concerned about the well-being of the community, which in turn makes them more likely to engage in altruistic behaviors, albeit at the risk of some loss [9, 15, 20]. The subjective experience of an individual social status resulting from situational initiation may similarly influence prosocial risky behavior. Although no study has yet directly examined the relationship between subjective social status and prosocial risky behavior using laboratory initiation, previous research using feedback methods to manipulate individual subjective social status found that contextually initiated experiences of briefly lower social status enhance individual risk-seeking [14] and prosocial levels [6]. Therefore, this study hypothesized that lower subjective social status individuals (vs. higher social status individuals) would be more inclined to engage in prosocial risky behavior regardless of trait or situational subjective social status (Hypothesis 1).

Prosocial risky behavior is dynamically variable, as situational characteristics influence it. The risk level is a key situational characteristic of prosocial risky behavior, reflecting the likelihood of individuals incurring losses and failures during the decision-making process. Research has demonstrated that individuals are more likely to engage in prosocial risky behavior in emergency scenarios compared to non-emergency situations, but only when the risk levels are high [21, 22]. This phenomenon can be understood through the cost-benefit model, which explains decision-making tendencies under varying levels of risk. According to this model, individuals generally prefer to avoid risk as risk levels increase, aiming to minimize the likelihood of significant losses [21]. In the context of prosocial risky dilemmas involving high risk, individuals with high subjective social status may rely on rational processing to evaluate the situation, ultimately leading them to favor risk-avoidant, non-helping behaviors. Thus, this study hypothesizes that the impact of subjective social status on prosocial risky behavior may be moderated by the risk level. Subjective social status negatively predicts prosocial risky behavior, with this effect being present only under conditions of high risk (Hypothesis 2).

In addition, social status can be seen as a form of culture shared by individuals of the same rank, with specific value systems within each rank influencing the cognitive patterns of individuals belonging to it [23]. In the field of cultural psychology, theories concerning values, self-concept, and cognition are prominently featured [1]. While values and self-concept have been extensively studied, the differentiation in cognitive perspectives, especially regarding thinking styles, has not been sufficiently explored [1, 23]. This gap is particularly evident in the context of examining the relationship between subjective social status and holistic thinking [18, 19, 20]. Cultural psychology and the threefold model of intellectual styles often emphasize distinctions in individual thinking styles [2, 24]. Holistic thinking, as an important psychological trait, shows significant incremental validity in explaining and predicting individual behavior [24], which may be a mediating mechanism in the relationship between subjective social status and prosocial risk behaviors. Specifically, holistic thinking refers to the tendency to view the context or field as a whole, including a focus on attending to the relationship between the object and the field, as well as a preference for interpreting and predicting what is likely to happen based on this relationship [25, 26]. On the one hand, previous studies have found a significant positive correlation between individual social status and their level of holistic thinking, high-status individuals tend to process social information holistically in interpersonal interactions, focusing on the intricate relationships between things and their environments [6, 27]. Therefore, this study hypothesized that subjective social status would positively predict their holistic thinking level. On the other hand, processing style theory suggests that individuals with a holistic mindset tend to view cognitive goals and their context as a whole, making it difficult to ignore unknown personal losses in prosocial risk dilemmas [27]. Moreover, prosocial risky behavior involves a trade-off between risk and social preferences, and individual levels of prosociality can be significantly diminished by the potentially significant threat posed by risk [22]. Individuals with a holistic mindset may engage in more unhelpful behaviors that are risk-averse. Thus, this study hypothesized that holistic thinking mediates the relationship between subjective social status and prosocial risky behaviors (Hypothesis 3).

In summary, this study aims to investigate the impact of subjective social status on prosocial risky behavior, as well as the boundary conditions that modulate this relationship, specifically the role of risk level. The study will also explore the mediating role of holistic thinking across two distinct studies. Specifically, Study 1 examined the correlations between trait subjective social status, holistic thinking, and prosocial risky behavior intentions using a questionnaire approach. Study 2 used an experimental method to manipulate individual situational subjective social status (high/low-status group) using a feedback-initiation paradigm, set the situational characteristics of prosocial risky dilemmas (high/low-risk level) in a laboratory setting, and measured individual holistic thinking and prosocial risky behavior simultaneously to further examine the causal relationship between subjective social status and prosocial risky behavior and reveal the boundary conditions and mediating mechanisms.

Study 1: the relationship between trait subjective social status, holistic thinking, and prosocial risky behavior intention

Participants

Using the Chinese Credamo online platform (https://www.credamo.com/), 700 Chinese questionnaires were randomly distributed; after excluding invalid questionnaires with incomplete answers, irregular or regular responses, and short response times, 640 valid questionnaires were retained, and the validity rate of the questionnaires was 91.43%. All participants were Chinese, the average age was 20.46 ± 2.25, with 340 female participants (53.13%).

Materials

Trait subjective social status

The Chinese Subjective Social Status Scale was employed to assess individual trait subjective social status [28, 29]. This scale utilizes a 10-step ladder as a metaphorical tool, inviting participants to evaluate their perceived social standing along this continuum. A score of 10 represents the highest subjective social status, characterized by attributes such as economic prosperity, holding highly respected occupations, receiving the best education, making significant social contributions, and enjoying societal privilege. In contrast, a score of 1 reflects the lowest subjective social status, associated with economic hardship, employment in low-respect occupations, minimal social contributions, and experiences of social marginalization. Thus, higher scores on the scale indicate individuals who perceive themselves as possessing a higher trait subjective social status.

Holistic thinking

The Chinese Holistic Thinking Scale developed by Hou et al. [30] was used to measure individual holistic thinking. The scale consists of 26 items and contains three dimensions: connectedness (sample item: “When looking at other people or things, I consider them from all sides”), ambivalence (sample item: “I often find myself inconsistently dealing with some issues”), change (sample item: “Natures of most people do not change over time”). Holistic thinking was scored on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Higher scores indicate a greater tendency to view things and deal with problems in a holistic way of thinking or conceptualizing (α = 0.94).

Prosocial risky behavior intention

Using the Prosocial Risky Behavior Intention Test, participants were required to respond to 20 prosocial risky dilemmas with either help or not help answers [9, 22]. Each dilemma is described as a risky helping situation (i.e., “The protagonist is in danger and needs assistance, and you are engaged in something significant. You need to decide whether to help him / her immediately”). The word count for each prosocial risky dilemma was carefully controlled, for example, approximately 35 words for each situation and about 40 words for the two options. A 2-point scoring system was applied, with 0 representing “Do not help; you will continue with your important matter and ignore his / her request,” and 1 representing “Help; he/she receives assistance, but there is an unknown possibility you will be able to continue with your important matter as planned”. The total score for prosocial risky behavior intention was calculated by summing up the responses to the 20 items. This provided a total score ranging from 0 to 20, with higher scores indicating a greater willingness to engage in prosocial risky behavior. (α = 0.81).

Procedure

The participants were informed that the study aimed to assess individual cognitive and behavioral intentions, and they were incentivized with a reward of five RMB for completing the test attentively. Prior to data collection, all participants provided informed consent and were assured of their right to withdraw from the study at any time. The formal testing procedure required participants to complete a series of measures in a specific sequence: demographic information, the Chinese Subjective Social Status Scale, the Chinese Holistic Thinking Scale, and the Prosocial Risky Behavior Intention Test. All procedures adhered to the ethical guidelines established by the China Association for Psychology.

Data analysis

Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between all key study variables were calculated using SPSS26.0. Second, the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Model 4) was used to evaluate the mediation model [31]. The PROCESS macro used 5,000 bootstrap samples to calculate 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for the model. If CIs excluded zero, the effect was considered statistically significant. All predictors were standardized as Z-scores before the analysis [32].

Results

Common method bias test

The dependence of the data on self-reporting may have resulted in a common method bias issue [33]. Statistically, the Harman single-factor test revealed 10 components with eigenvalues greater than 1, and the first factor’s variance of 25% fell short of the threshold of 40%. Consequently, the common method bias was not a serious problem in this study.

Descriptive statistics and correlations

The mean (M), standard deviation (SD), and correlation matrix for all variables are presented in Table 1.

Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations between variables (n = 640)
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Testing the mediation model

To test the mediation model, this study adopted the PROCESS Macro Model 4. The results are reported in Table 2; Fig. 1 after controlling for gender and age. Regression analyses showed that the direct effect of trait subjective social status on prosocial risky behavior intention was significant (β = -0.20, p < 0.001). Trait subjective social status affected prosocial risky behavior intention through an indirect path: trait subjective social status → holistic thinking → prosocial risky behavior intention. The direct effect of trait subjective social status on holistic thinking was significant (β = 0.11, p = 0.008). The direct effect of holistic thinking on prosocial risky behavior intention was significant (β = -0.09, p = 0.020). The mediation effects were tested using the bias-corrected percentile bootstrap method (random sampling was repeated 5000 times). The confidence interval for the holistic thinking was [-0.02, -0.01]. The mediating effect sizes were − 0.01, representing 5% of the total effect of the model.

Table 2 Testing the mediation effect on prosocial risky behavior intention
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Fig. 1
figure 1

The mediation model

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Discussion

The results of Study 1 preliminarily verified Hypotheses 1 and 3 that trait subjective social status significantly and negatively predicted an individual prosocial risky behavior intention and that holistic thinking played a significant mediating role. This reveals that individuals who rated themselves as lower in subjective social status were more likely to engage in prosocial risky behaviors, a tendency mediated by their lesser reliance on holistic thinking. However, Study 1 is a cross-sectional study, and the analysis of the mediating effects may have been somewhat biased. Moreover, Study 1 examined only trait subjective social status and not individual situational subjective social status. Therefore, Study 2 used an experimental method to further examine the causal relationship between situational subjective social status and prosocial risky behavior by manipulating the situational experience of an individual subjective social status using a feedback-initiation paradigm (high/low-status group) and setting up the situational characteristics of prosocial risk dilemmas in a laboratory setting (high/low-risk level). It also examined the mechanisms of situational subjective social status in influencing prosocial risky behavior by examining the boundary conditions (the role of risk level) and the mediating role of holistic thinking.

Study 2: the effects of situational subjective social status and risk level on holistic thinking and prosocial risky behavior

Participants

G* Power 3.1 software was used to calculate the sample size [34]. The results showed that this study needed to recruit at least 130 participants to ensure sufficient main effect test efficacy of the between-subject factor and interaction effect test efficacy (effect = 0.90) under the premise of medium effect size (f = 0.25). Therefore, 212 Chinese participants were randomly recruited for Study 2. The average age of the participants was 20.35 ± 2.21, with 106 female participants (50.00%). All the participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The experiment was conducted by the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the institution’s Ethics Committee. Each participant provided written informed consent.

Materials and procedure

Manipulation of situational subjective social status

A feedback initiation task was used to manipulate the situational subjective social status of participants [17], who were randomly divided into two groups (high/low-status group) and filled out personal information in a pre-programmed test software (E-prime, Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA) using a computer. Participants were told that they would retrieve a database of similar groups (similar individual occupation, level of education, income, wealth, and social contributions.) based on the information they had filled in and then compare their social status with that of similar groups, ultimately calculating a social status score (SSS). After the participants had finished registering their information, the computer monitor sequentially displayed a preset progress bar (sequentially presenting the data being read, connecting to the database, and calculating SSS). The actual calculation time was 1.5 min. Finally, the monitor presents a fake score feedback page, where participants in the high-status group receive a feedback score of + 87, while participants in the low-status group receive a feedback score of -523. Moreover, the score feedback page presents an explanation of the corresponding scores, with − 20 to + 20 being the average range of social status scores with their similar groups, with a score of less than − 20 indicating that the individual social status is lower than that of the similar group, and a score of greater than + 20 indicating that the individual social status is higher than that of the similar group. To reinforce the manipulation effect of situational subjective social status, participants were asked to fill in their feedback scores on the input screen following the feedback screen and to fill in five possible reasons why they thought they had received this feedback score (There is no time limit for responses on the feedback/input interface). To test the validity of the manipulation, participants were asked to complete the Chinese Subjective Social Status Scale [28, 29].

Prosocial risk dilemmas of setting risk levels

Study 2 categorized the 20 prosocial risky dilemmas used in Study 1 into high-risk and low-risk level conditions, with 10 dilemmas each. The high-risk level condition was set at 95%, while the low-risk level condition was set at 5% [22]. Each prosocial risky dilemma comprises a scenario and two options. For example, the scenario might describe a participant on their way to an ideal job interview who encounters an injured passerby in need of immediate hospitalization to avoid life-threatening consequences. The participant must decide how to act. One option illustrates a prosocial risky decision, where the participant helps, and the injured person receives timely medical treatment, but there is a 95% chance the participant will miss the important job interview. The other option describes a risk-avoidant non-help decision, where the participant does not help, arrives on time for the job interview, and the injured person misses the best opportunity for treatment. In addition to demonstrating the robustness of Study 1’s results, Study 2’s score for prosocial risky behavior was calculated by taking the mean of the responses to the 20 prosocial risky dilemmas. Each dilemma was scored on a 2-point scale, with 0 representing “Do not help” and 1 representing “Help” The mean score, ranging from 0 to 1, represented the average frequency of prosocial risky behaviors across all dilemmas. This approach allowed to examine the average tendency to help in prosocial risky dilemmas, taking into account the variability in responses across different dilemmas. The remaining settings for all dilemmas are the same as in Study 1.

Procedure

For the formal experiment, participants were randomly assigned to either the high or low-subjective social status group and followed instructions to complete the feedback approach to the subjective social status initiation task (which contained questions that reinforced the initiation effect), after which participants were asked to complete the Chinese Subjective Social Status Scale, Chinese Holistic Thinking Scale (α = 0.84), and prosocial risky behavioral dilemmas initiation task, in that order.

The classic prosocial risky dilemma priming task is commonly used to measure the behavioral responses evoked when individuals weigh “self-loss” against “other’s gain” in prosocial risky behavior [21]. Specifically, to enhance participants’ attention, a fixation point is first presented for 200ms, followed by a random blank screen lasting 500 to 800ms. Subsequently, the prosocial risky situation materials are presented. After reading, participants continue by pressing the spacebar. Then, options “F” and “J” are presented. Participants are required to respond quickly and carefully within 10000ms, with “F” representing not helping and “J” representing helping. This is followed by a 500ms blank screen, then feedback on the two types of prosocial risky decision outcomes, such as successful help with self-loss (the rescue is successful, but the participant has missed the opportunity to attend an important job interview) or successful help without self-loss (the rescue is successful, and the participant has not missed the opportunity to attend an important job interview), presented for 2000ms. The setup of computer software ensures that the feedback participants receive after each trial decision corresponds accurately to the risk level of that particular trial. For example, in a high-risk scenario, there is a 95% probability that participants will experience a loss to their self-interest. Consequently, there is a 95% likelihood that the feedback will indicate a “successful help with self-loss.” This feedback mechanism is crucial as it enables participants to clearly perceive the varying levels of risk. Additionally, participants are informed beforehand that each trial is independent, with no connections between successive trials. Afterward, there is a 500ms blank screen before proceeding to the next trial (Fig. 2). The prosocial risky dilemma priming task consists of 25 trials, and participants need to practice 5 trials before the formal experiment. The presentation order of all prosocial risky dilemmas is randomized, as is the order of the two options, and the key responses for the two options are counterbalanced across participants. All task information is presented through E-prime software. Finally, the experimenter explained the actual purpose of the experiment to the participants and gave them 15 RMB as payment for serious participation.

Fig. 2
figure 2

The sequence of a single trial in the prosocial risky dilemma priming task

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Data analysis

This study used a 2 (situational subjective social status: high subjective social status versus low subjective social status) × 2 (risk level: high-versus low-risk level) mixed design. An ANOVA was used to analyze how the dependent variable (i.e., help frequencies or prosocial risky behavior intention) was affected by both the within-subject variable (e.g., risk levels) and the between-subject variable (e.g., situational subjective social status). In addition, independent sample t-tests were used to analyze the effect of situational subjective social status on holistic thinking and to test the priming effect of situational subjective social status (comparing differences in scores on the subjective social status scale between the two groups of participants). SPSS software (version 26.0) was used to perform the statistical analysis of all data, and PROCESS macro-Model 4 was adopted to test the mediation model [31]. The PROCESS macro uses 5,000 bootstrap samples to calculate the 95% CIs for the model. If CIs excluded zero, the effect was considered statistically significant. All predictors were standardized as Z-scores before the analysis [32].

Results

Manipulation check

The results of the independent sample t-test indicated that participants in the low subjective social status group (M = 3.45, SD = 0.83) had significantly lower subjective social status scores compared to the high subjective social status group (M = 6.25, SD = 0.59), t(210) = -28.39, Cohen’s d = -3.89, p < 0.001, suggesting that the feedback method of initiating the task was effective in manipulating situational subjective social status.

The effects of situational subjective social status and risk level on prosocial risky behavior intention

The ANOVA results showed that the main effect of the situational subjective social status was significant, F(1, 210) = 10.28, p = 0.002, ηp2 = 0.05, thereby suggesting that low subjective social status individuals (M = 15.67, SD = 2.98) made more prosocial risk behavior compared to high subjective social status individuals (M = 14.16, SD = 3.82). Meanwhile, the main effect of the risk levels was significant, F(1, 210) = 59.98, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.22, thereby indicating that prosocial risky behavior intention in situations with low-risk levels (M = 8.13, SD = 1.75) were significantly higher than those in dilemmas involving high-risk levels (M = 6.78, SD = 2.52). Moreover, The interaction between situational subjective social status and risk levels was significant, F(1, 210) = 5.17, p = 0.024, ηp2 = 0.03. Through further simple effects analysis, the results showed that there was no significant difference in the prosocial risky behavior intention of high subjective social status individuals (M = 7.95, SD = 1.89) versus low subjective social status individuals (M = 8.31, SD = 1.57) who helped when faced with prosocial risk dilemmas in the low-risk level condition, F(1, 210) = 2.24, p = 0.136. However, in the high-risk level condition, significantly higher prosocial risky behavior intention of low subjective social status individuals (M = 7.36, SD = 1.95) than high subjective social status individuals (M = 6.21, SD = 2.88) were helped in the face of prosocial risk dilemmas, F(1, 210) = 11.59, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.24.

The effects of situational subjective social status and risk level on help frequencies of prosocial risky behavior

The ANOVA results showed that the main effect of the situational subjective social status was significant, F(1, 210) = 10.28, p = 0.002, ηp2 = 0.05, thereby suggesting that low subjective social status individuals (M = 0.78, SD = 0.15) made more prosocial risk behavior compared to high subjective social status individuals (M = 0.70 SD = 0.19). Meanwhile, the main effect of the risk levels was significant, F(1, 210) = 59.98, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.22, thereby indicating that help frequencies in situations with low-risk levels (M = 0.81, SD = 0.17) were significantly higher than those in dilemmas involving high-risk levels (M = 0.68, SD = 0.25). Moreover, The interaction between situational subjective social status and risk levels was significant, F(1, 210) = 5.17, p = 0.024, ηp2 = 0.03. Through further simple effects analysis, the results showed that there was no significant difference in the helping frequencies of high subjective social status individuals (M = 0.80, SD = 0.19) versus low subjective social status individuals (M = 0.83, SD = 0.16) who helped when faced with prosocial risk dilemmas in the low-risk level condition, F(1, 210) = 2.24, p = 0.136. However, in the high-risk level condition, significantly higher frequencies of low subjective social status individuals (M = 0.74, SD = 0.19) than high subjective social status individuals (M = 0.62, SD = 0.29) were helped in the face of prosocial risk dilemmas, F(1, 210) = 11.59, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.24 (Fig. 3a).

Fig. 3
figure 3

Helping frequencies under each condition(a), Holistic thinking under each condition(b)

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The effects of situational subjective social status on holistic thinking

The results of the independent sample t-test indicated that compared to the high subjective social status group (M = 65.11, SD = 7.03), participants in the low subjective social status group had significantly lower levels of holistic thinking (M = 61.14, SD = 8.36), t(210) = -3.75, Cohen’s d = -0.51, p < 0.001 (Fig. 3b).

Descriptive statistics and correlations

The means (M), standard deviations (SD), and correlation matrices for all variables are presented in Table 3.

Table 3 Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations between variables (n = 212)
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Testing the mediation model

To test the mediation model, this study adopted the PROCESS Macro Model 4. Regression analyses showed that the direct effect of situational subjective social status on prosocial risky behavior intention was significant (β = -0.17, p = 0.013). Situational subjective social status affected prosocial risky behavior intention through an indirect path: situational subjective social status → holistic thinking → prosocial risky behavior intention. The direct effect of situational subjective social status on holistic thinking was significant (β = 0.25, p = 0.001). The direct effect of holistic thinking on prosocial risky behavior intention was significant (β = -0.18, p = 0.009). The mediation effects were tested using the bias-corrected percentile bootstrap method (random sampling was repeated 5000 times). The confidence interval for the holistic thinking was [-0.09, -0.01]. The mediating effect size was 0.05, representing 22% of the model’s total effect.

The results are reported in Table 4; Fig. 4. Regression analyses showed that the direct effect of situational subjective social status on total helping frequencies of prosocial risky behavior was significant (β = -0.34, p = 0.013). Situational subjective social status affected total helping frequencies of prosocial risky behavior through an indirect path: situational subjective social status → holistic thinking → total helping frequencies of prosocial risky behavior. The direct effect of situational subjective social status on holistic thinking was significant (β = 0.49, p < 0.001). The direct effect of holistic thinking on total helping frequencies was significant (β = -0.18, p = 0.009). The mediation effects were tested using the bias-corrected percentile bootstrap method (random sampling was repeated 5000 times). The confidence interval for the holistic thinking was [-0.19, -0.02]. The mediating effect size was 0.09, representing 21% of the model’s total effect.

Table 4 Testing the mediation effect on total helping frequencies
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Fig. 4
figure 4

The mediation model

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Discussion

Study 2 examined the boundary conditions and mediating mechanisms through which situational subjective social status affects prosocial risky behavior by manipulating individual situational subjective social status (high/low status) using a feedback-initiated paradigm and setting the situational characteristics of prosocial risk dilemmas (high/low-risk level) in a laboratory setting. Specifically, as with trait subjective social status, situational subjective social status significantly and negatively predicted individual prosocial risky behavior, and the high-risk level was the boundary condition for significant differences in prosocial risky behavior responses between the two types of individuals. Hypotheses 1 and 2 were verified. This elucidates the causal relationship between subjective social status and prosocial risky behavior, as well as its boundary conditions. Moreover, holistic thinking mediated the relationship between situational subjective social status and prosocial risky behavior, thus verifying Hypothesis 3.

General discussion

Both trait and situational subjective social status negatively predict prosocial risky behavior

The present study found that subjective social status significantly and negatively predicted individual prosocial risky behaviors, both at the trait and situational levels. As subjective social status increased, individuals were more likely to opt for risk avoidance in the face of prosocial risky dilemmas, which is supported by previous studies [35, 36]. For example, one study found that people with lower subjective social status allocated more tokens to strangers in a dictator game, donated a higher percentage of their annual salary to charity, gave more tokens to strangers in a trust game, and were more willing to sacrifice their time to help others [20]. Moreover, Samson and Zaleskiewicz found that different social status individuals have different amounts of disposable resources and different abilities to resist risk; individuals with lower subjective social status tend to be at a disadvantage in social competition and are more inclined to take risks to gain benefits [16], so such individuals have a greater preference for risk. Studies on subjective social status and moral decision-making also provide evidence that those in higher subjective social status have higher levels of propensity for immoral decision-making and are more likely to choose to engage in risk-averse immoral behaviors in risky moral dilemmas to safeguard their interests [37]. The compensatory sense of control model explains this by stating that those with lower subjective social status are more vulnerable to the external environment, such as unsafe neighborhood environments, unstable jobs, unstable schooling, and uncertainty about resources owing to their relative lack of resources [11, 18, 19]. Consequently, such individuals develop a socio-cognitive orientation of dependence on the self, which makes them more likely to be more attentive to the needs of others, oriented towards others, and behave more prosocially in their social lives, even if they suffer from a certain risk of self-loss [3]. Moreover, this model suggests that different social statuses cause their members to develop relatively stable patterns of social cognition and that prolonged or brief exposure to a particular social status environment can cause individuals to exhibit specific patterns of social cognition [19]. Thus, both trait-based perceptions of subjective social status and situational experiences at low levels are more likely to elevate individual social preferences and inhibit risk-averse tendencies than at high levels, which in turn leads to more prosocial risky behavior.

High-risk level was a boundary condition for subjective social status to influence prosocial risky behavior

This study further found that a high-risk level is a boundary condition for subjective social status that negatively predicts prosocial risky behavior. Risk levels moderated the effect of subjective social status on prosocial risky behavior; with low subjective social status, individuals tend to make more prosocial risky behaviors compared to high subjective social status individuals in the high-risk condition, whereas no such differences were observed in the low-risk condition. Some studies have provided explanatory frameworks for this phenomenon from a sociocultural perspective. In analyzing the psychological mechanisms of social status inequality, Stephens et al. suggested an essential difference in the self-orientation of people with high and low subjective social status [38]. Specifically, the cultural environment of the middle class shapes their cultural beliefs about their independent selves, expresses more self-preferences, is more concerned with their interests, and disregards the needs of others than those of the working class [4, 38]. Moreover, prosocial risky behavior involves the integrated processing of risk and social preferences. Risk level, a situational trait that influences individual risk preferences, moderates an individual level of prosociality, with an increase in risk level decreasing the probability of rescuing others in an emergency [22, 39]. Therefore, individuals with high subjective social status may be more self-interested than those with low subjective social status, and such individuals are more risk-sensitive; their risk avoidance tendency will be significantly increased in the face of high-risk situations, and their social preference will be seriously weakened. However, individuals with low subjective social status have limited social resources and are more concerned about cooperating with others to obtain long-term benefits. Therefore, such individuals are less affected by risk-level factors and engage more in prosocial risky behaviors in high-risk conditions compared to those with high subjective social status. Moreover, the conclusion is that the boundary condition for subjective social status influencing prosocial risky behavior is a high-risk level rather than a low-risk level. The theoretical model of prosocial risky behaviors and the cost-reward model also explain this from the perspective of competitive altruism [9]. Low-risk-level conditions pose less of a threat to those with high subjective social status, so their prosocial risky behavior tendencies are not significantly different from those with low subjective social status. People are willing to take the risk of providing aid to others in low-risk level conditions in exchange for potential future gains (such as achieving cooperation and enhancing reputation), demonstrating a limited tendency to take risks altruistically.

Holistic thinking mediates between subjective social status and prosocial risky behavior

In addition, holistic thinking was found to be a mediating mechanism through which subjective social status influences prosocial risky behavior. On the one hand, an increase in subjective social status significantly enhanced individual holistic thinking, both at the trait and situational levels. Previous studies have reported similar findings [13, 40]. For example, empowered individuals tend to use a holistic approach to information processing, will tend to view problems in a connected and holistic way, will tend to emphasize the relationships between things, and integrate problems with the context in which they are situated [13]. This study extends this conclusion by suggesting that individual levels of holistic thinking can be attributed not only to their increased power but also to their increased subjective social status. This is explained by the processing theory of subjective social status, which states that individuals with high subjective social status can recognize and process information in social contexts more comprehensively because they have received good general education and cognitive training. Such individuals believe that things do not exist independently but are connected, emphasizing the holistic nature of their thinking [13]. However, previous study has indicated that individuals with lower social status are more inclined towards collectivist values, emphasizing the relationship between the individual and their environment, and internalizing the self-concept as an important member of significant in-groups, such as family and friends [3]. In addition to cultural value orientations and self-conceptions, cultural psychology theories primarily focus on the differences in cognitive orientations among individuals from different cultural backgrounds, that is, differences in modes of thinking [2, 24]. Holistic thinking is an important indicator of cognitive orientation in collectivist cultures. This study, from the perspective of subjective social status, provides new evidence for the differences in cognitive orientations among individuals of varying social statuses [18, 23]. This enriches the research on cognitive orientation differences in cultural psychology [18, 19, 20]. Incorporating holistic thinking into the research framework of subjective social status helps to broaden the scope of social status research and further deepens the understanding of its theoretical implications in the dimension of cultural differences. Moreover, this contributes to revealing the impact of individual differences stemming from social status on holistic thinking, thereby providing a new entry point for addressing the negative impacts of social status disparities on individual psychology and behavior.

On the other hand, increased levels of holistic thinking can prevent individuals from engaging in prosocial risky behaviors. This conclusion is supported by Ji et al. [27], who concluded that individuals with an analytical thinking orientation are more concerned with the relationship between the external environment and themselves than individuals with a holistic thinking orientation. That information about the external context is given greater weight in their cognitive processing. The weakening effect of negative information on prosocial motivation is further strengthened in such individuals who are more concerned with information regarding the risk of loss in prosocial risky dilemmas [22, 27]. Additionally, differences in subjective social status can be regarded as specific cultural differences [39, 41]. The cognitive difference theory of cultural psychology and the theoretical model of prosocial risky behavior can together provide an explanatory framework for this conclusion [9, 42]. Compared to those with a high subjective social status, those with a low subjective social status have a lower level of holistic thinking, and because of their lack of social resources, they need to achieve long-term cooperation with others to better adapt to society. Therefore, such individuals, when faced with prosocial risky dilemmas, are more inclined to fine-tune information about unknown losses and potential gains in the situation (opportunities for cooperation as a result of helping others). After rational trade-offs, they show a behavioral tendency to engage in more prosocial risky behavior as a result of competitive altruism.

Limitations and future research directions

There are still some shortcomings in this study that need to be further improved and expanded in future research. Firstly, the analysis did not differentiate between high-risk and low-risk helping behaviors in the mediation analysis. This decision was made to maintain consistency with our theoretical framework, which posits a uniform influence of holistic thinking across risk levels. However, we recognize the potential value in examining these effects separately, as risk level may moderate the relationship between subjective social status and prosocial behavior. Future studies should consider conducting separate mediation analyses for high-risk and low-risk helping behaviors to provide a more nuanced understanding of these dynamics. Secondly, the sample primarily consisted of early adult individuals, which limits the generalizability of our findings. Future research should aim to recruit a more diverse age range of participants to better understand how age may influence the relationship between subjective social status and prosocial risky behavior. Thirdly, the current study’s conclusions may have limitations in terms of cross-cultural applicability. Given the dominant ideology of collectivism in the Chinese cultural context, our findings may not be directly applicable to cultures with a stronger emphasis on individualism. Cross-cultural studies examining the differences in subjective social status and prosocial risk behaviors are needed to broaden our understanding of these phenomena globally. Fourthly, the current study did not explore potential intervention paths to alleviate the differences in prosocial risky behavior related to subjective social status. Future research should investigate interventions such as positive thinking training and empathy training to promote positive behavioral tendencies in individuals across different social statuses. Fifthly, while we have highlighted the mediating role of holistic thinking, other mechanisms, such as rationality and intuition, may also influence prosocial risky behavior in different contexts. Future studies should investigate these alternative mechanisms to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the decision-making processes involved in prosocial risky behavior. Lastly, the feedback method used in this study to manipulate subjective social status may have a short-lived priming effect. Longitudinal surveys could be employed in future research to investigate the dynamic relationship between subjective social status and prosocial risky behavior over time, accounting for the potential influence of social status mobility. By addressing these limitations, future research can build upon the current study’s findings and provide a more comprehensive understanding of the complex interplay between subjective social status, prosocial risky behavior, and the influence of risk level.

Conclusion

This study examines the boundary conditions and cognitive mechanisms by which subjective social status negatively predicts prosocial risky behavior, providing new evidence for understanding the behavioral responses and cognitive processes of individuals with different social statuses in prosocial risky dilemmas. The present study suggests that both trait / contextual subjective social status negatively predicted individual prosocial risky behaviors. Individuals with low subjective social status were more likely to engage in prosocial risky behaviors than those with high subjective social status, and this difference was only present in the high-risk level condition. Moreover, holistic thinking mediates the relationship between subjective social status and prosocial risky behaviors. Increasing subjective social status can enhance individual holistic thinking. However, this will impede the occurrence of prosocial risky behavior.

This study has significant implications for mitigating the negative impacts of social status disparities on individual psychology and behavior. Theoretically, the study clarifies the mediating role of holistic thinking between subjective social status and prosocial risky behavior. From the perspective of individual cognitive orientation in cultural psychology, the study constructs a theoretical model of how subjective social status influences prosocial risky behavior, specifying the pathways of the effect. Practically, the study emphasizes the boundary conditions under which subjective social status negatively predicts prosocial risky behavior, which is crucial for alleviating the negative effects of social status disparities. Specifically, the study offers guidance for social governance and policy-making, highlighting that high risk levels are key conditions for differences in subjective social status related to prosocial risky behavior. Clarifying these boundary conditions and cognitive mechanisms helps to better understand and intervene in the prosocial risky behavior of individuals with different subjective social statuses, thereby promoting the enhancement of prosocial levels among individuals of different subjective social statuses in risky situations.

Data availability

The datasets presented in this study can be accessed via https://doiorg.publicaciones.saludcastillayleon.es/10.3886/E208893V4.

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank all participants for their collaboration.

Funding

This work was supported by National Social Science Foundation of China (Major Program) (19ZDA021) and Outstanding Innovative Talents Cultivation Funded Programs 2024 of Renmin University of China.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Psychology, Renmin University of China, Beijing, 100872, China

    Changlin Liu, Yanan Hong, Huihan Yang & Ping Hu

  2. Department of Psychology, Hunan University of Science and Technology, Xiangtan, 411201, China

    Youlong Zhan

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Contributions

CL and YH prepared the materials and measures. CL, YH, and HY collected and analyzed the data. CL and YZ drew tables and figures. CL wrote and amended the manuscript. PH reviewed the manuscript. All authors contributed to the article and approved the submitted version.

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Correspondence to Ping Hu.

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The study involving human participants received approval from the Ethics Committee of Renmin University of China (IRB: 24–053). All procedures adhered to the ethical guidelines outlined in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki, including its subsequent amendments or comparable ethical standards. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to their involvement in the study. Additionally, explicit informed consent was secured from each individual who participated in this study.

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Liu, C., Hong, Y., Yang, H. et al. Do achievers tend to share goodness with the world? The effect of subjective social status on prosocial risky behavior. BMC Psychol 13, 164 (2025). https://doiorg.publicaciones.saludcastillayleon.es/10.1186/s40359-025-02485-7

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